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Abstract
A collaborative relationship between native peoples and industrial corporationstwo actors that value
resource-rich landis of vital importance for both the United States and the Russian Federation. A strong
partnership between industrial and indigenous actors can help to ensure not only the stability of extractive
projects, but also the protection of indigenous groups from the potentially existential threats associated with
territorial loss. Cooperation between these two parties gains urgency as extractive corporations begin to
explore the Arctic, a region of the world already home to over two dozen unique indigenous communities. In
both the United States and the Russian Federation, there are legal precedents for negotiations regarding
indigenous rights, natural resources, and the fuel-energy complex. Even so, parties involved in the extractive
process frequently stray from these national and international legal guidelines. Our paper seeks to answer the
question: why might rational actorshere, indigenous and industrial communities that are motivated by
their preferencesfail to cooperate on extractive projects, even when robust collaborative agreements benefit
all sides? We suggest that the explanation is twofold: first, indigenous land rights lack the consistency which
may give indigenous communities control over their resources and cultural preservation; and second, a
neutral and objective third-party mediatorwhether in the form of a state or an international bodyis often
silent in, or absent from, the negotiation process, thereby undermining its authority to ensure fair and
reasonable deliberations. Our findings can offer important insights for community-corporate relations, not
only in the Arctic, but worldwide.
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1. Irreconcilable ideals and power politics1
Sergey Kechimov, 57, is the guardian of Lake Imlor, a sacred Surgut Khanty site
located within the Russian Federation’s Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Region and
the Fedorovka oil field. Native groups protect communal areas like Lake Imlor for
ceremonial and spiritual purposes; in these Territories of Traditional Nature Use
(TTNU), fishing, hunting, and the keeping of dogs are religiously prohibited
activities.2 Meanwhile, Surgutneftegas, the oil company fighting for use of the
indigenous land, claims that one million tons of oil lie beneath the tribal area.3 As
Surgutneftegas extraction projects circle closer and closer around Lake Imlor, they
pollute the air, intoxicate waterways, and carry fire hazards, threatening the safety
and quality of life for the area’s remaining Khanty community.
Surviving on this native land in the middle of the Fedorovka oil field seems almost
impossible for both reindeer and the Khanty people that herd themthe wood is
impoverished, the moss is gone, and the little remaining pasture has long since been
pressed to the ground by the wheels of vehicles crossing to and from extraction sites.
With their land under threat and alternative job prospects negligible, the Khanty
people have largely left Lake Imlor. And yet, Kechimov stays behind, claiming a
sense of duty to protect the sacred site; a descendant of shamans, he refuses to betray
his ancestors and their heritage.
In September 2014, after more than four years of ongoing confrontations with oil
executives, illegal poachers, and hostile workers, Kechimov shot a group of attacking dogs,
which were originally brought to the area by oil workers. By January 2015, Surgutneftegas
charged Kechimov with criminal assault, the terms of which were not made clear to
Kechimov in his native language until his court hearing six months later in June 2015.4
Writes Maria Favorsky, a representative from the environmental advocacy group
GreenPeace: ‘‘Locals see the charges as a blatant attempt by the oil industry to scare off
indigenous opposition to oil drilling, and to get rid of a man who literally stood in its way.’’5
According to Elena Sakirko, a campaigner for indigenous people with Greenpeace,
Kechimov was convicted in the fall of 2016 of threatening to kill the rig workers.6 And
while Kechimov circumvented a two-year prison sentence, Surgutneftegas continues to
encircle Lake Imlor, posing a long-term threat to his community and way of life.
2. Introduction
The story of Sergey Kechimov and Surgutneftgas is not the first tale of failed
cooperation on an extractive project; in fact, tensions between indigenous and
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industrial actors are common. We saw this quite recently in the forty-week long,
violent standoff of 2016 between the Sioux Tribe at Standing Rock and representa-
tives of the Dakota Access Pipeline, restarted in 2017 in reaction to US President
Donald Trump’s Executive Order on the Keystone XL Pipeline. Assuming that
extractive projects will continue to take placeat least until the development of clean
energy technology, designing an enforceable path for partnership is ever vital.
Robust and reliable negotiations between industrial and indigenous actors can help
to ensure not only the stability of extractive projects, but also the protection of
indigenous groups from existential threats associated with territorial loss. While
international and domestic law provide precedent for cooperation, parties involved in
the extractive process frequently stray from these institutional guidelines, inevitably
resulting in negative consequences that vary from unbalanced negotiations to
escalated violence.
Many historic lands occupied by indigenous communities contain vast reserves of oil
and natural gas.7 Furthermore, the indigenous peoples living on resource-rich land are
sometimes expected to bear the environmental costs of extraction without adequate
compensation or comprehensive global protections.8 As industrial actors continue to
expand their role in resource-rich territories, it is important that states and international
organizations establish strongerand reinforce existingincentives for preliminary
negotiations and corporate responsibility initiatives.9 Over the last five years, research
on industry-indigenous relations has increased substantially, an indication of the
growing importance of integrating human rights protections into extractive projects.10
This begs the following question: How can powerful actors and at-risk minorities share
natural resources with minimal negative consequences? Specifically, we are interested in
how industrial actors affiliated with two major northern powersthe United States and
the Russian Federationcan establish shared best practices in indigenous relations as
they expand their resource extraction industries in Alaska, Siberia, and the Arctic.
This project is built on three assumptions: first, extractive processes will take
place as long as a global demand exists; second, industrial actors want to avoid costly
legal battles and public relations problems; and third, indigenous actors desire
protection from existential threats and compensation for losses.11 Presumably, both
parties want to mitigate the likelihood or severity of these potential extractive risks.12
Some industrial actors, such as the oil companies Chevron and Rosneft, do this by
offering financial benefits to indigenous communities or by incorporating indigenous
leaders as extractive consultants.13 However, despite the likelihood that discon-
tent can lead to protests, property damage, or physical violence, many extractive
processes continue to operate without effective indigenous integration.14 With the
understanding that preliminary negotiations are effective in mitigating risk, why
do international organizations and states vary in their tendency to incorporate
indigenous players in extractive operations?
Indeed, much of the current literature approaches resource extraction in
indigenous lands as a zero-sum game, where only the industrial or indigenous actor
‘wins’.15 This binary between winner and loser results in a scholarly gap as it ignores
some potential areas for cooperation. Thus, our research question asks: is there a
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possible extractive scenario where all actors cooperate to improve their overall gains?
We hypothesize that enforceable preliminary negotiations, supervised by a neutral
and objective third party, will lead to smoother and lower-cost extractive operations
because they mitigate potential post-extraction risks. This coincides with traditional
collective action theory, which suggests that a third party is necessary in mitigating
conflicts, enforcing agreements, and imposing sanctions.16
The goal of this paper is to understand better the puzzle of preliminary negotiations
on resource extractive projects and, in particular, the factors present when they
operate most effectively. We suggest that neutral mediators and state institutions
designed to ensure credible commitments are a preferable, and often necessary means
of reaching successful agreements. Our paper is organized as follows: first, we explore
the existing literature on negotiations and determine the unique characteristics of
indigenous-industrial negotiations, namely the universe of actors, interests, and
intervenors that may be involved. Next, we offer some background on our casesthe
United States and the Russian Federation. We start with a legal and socio-political
overview of industry-indigenous relations in the two countries before delving into our
particular cases. In order to bring a methodological consistency to this project, we
conduct a four-pronged comparison of industry-indigenous relations on extractive
projects in Alaska, the American Southwest, the Russian Far East, and in Siberia.
We chose to conduct a comparative analysis of the United States and Russia
because of their many similaritiesregional hegemonic status, demographic makeup,
conservative national culture, overall landmass, Arctic territory, natural resources,
and the characteristics of their indigenous populations. While there are some legal
and socio-political differences, we argue that conflicts between indigenous and
industrial actors on issues related to resource extraction are problematic in similar
ways in both cases. We conclude our paper with an analysis section that highlights
instances when legislation or norms promoted by a third-party helped or hindered
peaceful negotiations between the indigenous and industrial actors. Throughout the
paper, we rely on first-hand interviews with experts and community leaders, existing
legislation, press regarding legal proceedings, and scholarly literature.
Uncovering best practices for industrial-indigenous relations is important; enforce-
able preliminary negotiations could protect indigenous actors against heritage loss and
corporate actors from legitimacy problems. As we hope to show in this article,
the possibilities for comparative study on this topic are vast and largely unexplored.
This is a critical and timely puzzle for the global north as it balances the quest for energy
and natural resources with at-risk, resource-based indigenous minorities. Further-
more, this research on industry-indigenous relations can be applied far beyond these
particular actors. Indeed, this project could also offer insights into the power dynamics
of cooperation between unequal partners across temporal and spatial planes.
3. Why negotiate?
In order to determine the benefits of preliminary agreements on extraction projects,
we seek to first define the actors, interests, and traditional institutionsor systems of
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rules that govern behavior in the negotiation processinvolved.17 We define the
negotiation process as the series of discussions regarding an adversarial scenario,
in which two or more actors with unique interests attempt to reach an agreement.
By evaluating barriers and assessing room for cooperation, the negotiation process
can help to address competing party interests and ethical concerns, while maximizing
joint value.18
In order to achieve successful negotiations, actors must define their termswhat are
they willing to sacrifice and for what are they willing to fight? By clearly delineating
interests and expectations, parties can hope to overcome legal stalemate. However,
barriers inevitably remain: for one, actors are responsible to their constituencies,
which may be divided on how to determine interests and sacrifices. Furthermore,
actors may engage in secrecy or deception, which could result in fac¸ade negotiations
(in which one or more party does not intend to follow through with the agreed-upon
result of the proceedings). Last, actors may hold unequal power in the negotiation
proceedings, due to variation in funds available, political connections, or legal
precedent.19 Under these conditions of unequal negotiation, a weaker actor can
strengthen their side by redefining their capacity (for example, by bargaining formally
and collectively, instead of informally and individually), by setting hard deadlines, and
by worsening the consequences of a refused offer for the other actor(s).20 It should be
noted that threats intended to encourage the stronger party to negotiate in good faith
can backfire, resulting in retaliation from the opposing side and heightened overall
costs. Last, these proceedings can become intractable when actors hold competing
interests or definitions regarding the sacred, which can reference tangible claims*for
example, the indivisibility of ancestral waterwaysor intangible claims, such as those
related to primordialism.21 Following Howard Raiffa’s logic in his book The Art and
Science of Negotiation, we use the following section to walk through the negotiation
process on resource extraction projects, outlining the universe of potential actors,
interests, and intervenors.22
The first player in such a bargaining agreement is the industrial, or firm-based,
actor. Arguably, industrial actors are positioned to gain the most benefit from the
extractive process, regardless of whether they engage the indigenous partner. The
potential gains are predominantly financial, as the industrial actor not only increases
revenue with each additional extraction project, but also positions itself ahead of its
competition with the discovery of each new site. And yet, industrial actors have many
avenues of potential loss in these scenarios, such as potentially violent protests in the
name of land rights, cultural destruction, and environmental devastation. Protests
could lead to financial costs in site equipment repairs, delayed extractions, and the
loss of life. Furthermore, oil spills could destroy water systems and wildlife habitats
not just for residents near the extraction site, but potentially for all those whose
waterways produce markets and food sources tangentially connected with the site.
If not handled in a timely and thorough manner, these immediate concerns could
cause significant harm to industrial actors on an international stage. Public relations
scandals could result in severed contracts, expensive and lengthy legal battles, and a
subsequent market drop.
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The second actor involved in extraction processes is the local, aggregated community.
Here, we understand the local community as indigenous to the land, particularly in cases
of geographically isolated extraction. It is possible, however, that a local community may
be composed of non-indigenous citizens, or some combination thereof, commonly
present in cases of inland extraction. Despite this understanding, we use this opportunity
to focus on indigenous actors in these preliminary negotiation processes.
Assuming that the termination of an extractive plan is an unlikely outcome,
potential bargaining gains for indigenous actors vary. At most, an indigenous actor
may gain a desirable and balanced agreement that includes structural accommoda-
tions for spiritual sites or adequate compensation in exchange for permitted land-use
(even so, some indigenous communities may find no amount of compensation
acceptable for extractive activities that result in permanent changes to their
landscapes and livelihoods). At the very least, the indigenous community may gain
visibility by aggregating their interests through the use of collective representation.
Between these poles exists a plethora of financial, emotional, and political degrees
of support. For the indigenous community, a failure to organize or negotiate may
result in a complete disregard for their preferences. The possible consequences of
this failure include forced displacement, assimilation, loss of land, loss of language,
and loss of culture. Surely, for the indigenous community, it appears to be more
beneficial to negotiate than to stay silent.
Finally, the third actor present in industry-indigenous relations is the state or, less
frequently, an international mediator. Mediators, when monitoring negotiations in
good faith, can play a largely positive role. First, they can prevent tensions from
escalating as their participation encourages negotiating actors to ‘‘at least appear to
be reasonable.’’23 This may result in greater respect for the negotiation process,
including its deadlines and enforcement. Second, a mediator can help parties find
equal footing in negotiation proceedings by carving out time for each party to state
their case, by reframing interests in nonthreatening terms, and, in theory, by helping
both parties conclude with an equitable arrangement.
Of course, mediation can turn sour; mediators can maintain their own interests, pick
sides, or engage in secret talks with actors that parallel the formal negotiations. Finding
an ethical and neutral negotiator on issues related to resource extraction can be
particularly difficult. For example, a state may gain revenue from successful extractions
or its politicians may reap public approval if extractive projects boost employment rates,
and therefore the state could share interests with a particular actor. Indeed, in the
Russian Federation, for example, many large oil and gas companies are public, or state-
owned, corporations. In these scenarios, the state maintains many of the same benefits
and costs as the industrial actor: successful negotiations lead to financial rewards and
failed negotiations can beget protests and vandalism.
The difference between industrial actors and the state is the degree to which they
can circumvent restrictions. An industrial actor, finding barriers to business within a
particular state, could well refuse to conduct operations in said state in the future.
However, the state is uniquely aware of a need for sustainability in its actions*the
threat of popular uprising, which could result in electoral defeat, may be incentive
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enough to demand that actors engage in fair negotiations. Likewise, international
public relations crises could damage states if they result in economic sanctions from
the international community. In short, the costs, while similar, are ultimately
heightened for the state actor. Therefore, we argue that while industrial actors
generally focus on mitigating short-term risks, the state maintains an interest in
establishing strong institutions that can reduce long-term risk.
Assuming that each of these actors are rational, in that they learn from previous
interactions, process new information, rank their preferences, and act in order to
mitigate potential costs, it appears that each of these three actors benefits from
participating in, and maintaining, preliminary negotiations on extraction projects.
Consider the following simulated situation in which a negotiation between
industrial and indigenous actors takes place. A tribe has lived on a one-hundred-
acre plot of land for twelve generations. Not only is the land a spiritual center for
the community, but it also serves as an avenue of sustainability for the tribe’s
hunters and gatherers. Families drink from local water sources and flocks of animals
feed freely in the wide expanses. Meanwhile, representatives from Exxon Oil
discover reserves of natural resourcesoil and gasin the region around the tribal
lands and feel confident that reserves exist on the indigenous land, as well. Exxon
Oil knows that new oil reserves help to flood the market and lower domestic oil
prices, which in turn lowers the costs of plastics, manufacturing, and transporta-
tion. Meanwhile, state interests rest divided: on the one hand, the state is eager to
use domestic resources over contentious overseas supplies on economic, national
defense, and moral grounds; on the other hand, the state maintains an interest in
preventing the domestic unrest from threatened minority groups or negative
publicity for perceived human rights violations. When interests diverge like this,
how can conflict be mitigated?
Surely, the indigenous interest of preservationquite literally, funding their day-
to-day lives through hunting and gatheringcan be supplemented with monies
provided by Exxon Oil. However, while this sudden change in income may open new
avenues for different kinds of labor, it may also potentially lead to new problems:
diets of heavily processed foods, substance abuse, and benefit addictions. Even if
Exxon Oil compensates the indigenous community for the extractive use of its land,
no cash payment can replace a destroyed sacred space. In addition, Exxon Oil must
allot funds for emergency spill and public relations management. These defense
measures can become exceedingly expensive. Finally, the state’s position remains
precarious, as a negative situation, such as a civilian death or an oil spill, may reflect
poorly not only on the industrial actor, but on the state and its leadership as well.
By permitting an industrial actor to operate without consequence within its borders,
the state takes on a portion of the potential rewards, but also the liability. Therefore,
it is in the state’s interest, as much as the industrial actor’s interest, for the extractive
process to go as smoothly as possible.
It is possible, as a counter-factual, that preliminary negotiations do not result in
mitigated risk for actors on both sides of the bargaining agreement. The very act of
bargaining implies a certain willingness on the part of the indigenous community to
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cooperate with industrial actors by sacrificing their land in exchange for material
benefits, whether from a position of dominance, as in the case of the semi-sovereign
Northern Ute, or from a position of weakness, as in the case of Alaskan nations
before the seemingly inevitable expansion of the oil pipeline. Is it possible that, for
the indigenous actor, greater benefit lies in refusing to negotiate with industrial
actors? So, too, for industrial actors: negotiations may result in up-front incon-
veniences that fail to outweigh the potential long-term costs of extractive projects.
After all, it is possible that protests, vandalism, death, safety mishaps, and
environmental crises will never actually take place. Therefore, it is possible to
assume that the industrial actor takes a greater risk by participating in preliminary
negotiations than in evading them.
Overall, we argue that the state and the industrial actor hold the upper hand in
negotiations regarding resource extraction on land traditionally occupied by
native peoples, while the indigenous community remains relatively weak. In some
cases, this asymmetry is mitigated by the latter’s ability to organize collectively;
however, even in the case of collective bargaining, we suggest that a neutral arbiter
is requisite in ensuring that enforceable negotiations are conducted fairly between
unequal actors. Therefore, the best way to avoid a potential existential threat for
the latter is to give governing authority to the state or to an international commission
with the ability to enforce agreements domestically. In the case of industry-
indigenous conflict, in particular, mediators can level an asymmetrical negotiation
by establishing indigenous leaders as de facto veto-power extractive consultants so
that these communities can share the burden of conducting a safe and efficient
operation.
It is important to note that while an extractive project is ostensibly its own
bargaining game with unique participating actors, these actors could feasibly be
involved in other games with other unique actors. For example, in the scenario
outlined above, Exxon Oil could be involved in preliminary negotiations with a
coalition of indigenous leaders in Alaska as well as native leadership in the
southwestern United States. On the one hand, it is possible that the industrial actor
in this scenario will learn from the other scenario in real time, but it is also possible
that actors involved in multiple games understand how to rank the gravity of each
game and even how to play opposing actors off one another. Firm-based actors may
also have private arrangements with national actors, compromising the autonomy
of both parties. The possibility of multiple under-the-table agreements not subject
to transparent public review complicates the potential outcome and benefit of
preliminary negotiations.
4. Cases: United States and Russian Federation
To investigate this puzzle of preliminary negotiations, we highlight extractive
projects in both the United States and the Russian Federation.24 We chose these two
countries as they are global superpowers with substantial territory in the Arctic region.
We also considered the value in positioning the US and Russian cases side-by-side to
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demonstrate a shared puzzle in a temporal moment in history when the two countries
appear to be diametrically opposed in all matters of domestic and foreign policy. In
future expansions on this project, it will certainly be valuable to include other cases
relevant to the global north, including Canada and Scandinavia.
In this section of our paper, we present a descriptive summary of our findings,
divided between the inland and remote regions of each country. We chose to divide
our cases in this manner in order to ensure an expansive breadth of existing cases, and
a deeper understanding of each of our four designated regions. In theory, the inland
cases outline scenarios where industry-indigenous extractions take place in more
population-dense regions, or in closer connection with urban centers. We suggest that
these cases may be affected by established political institutions, frequent monitoring,
and networks of roads. Alternatively, we also compare two remote regions that are
geographically or physically separate from major urban centers and political oversight.
We chose to alternate between these regions in an effort to demonstrate a variety of
industry-indigenous relations in these two states.
We begin this section with an evaluation of the legal and socio-political
background of industry-indigenous relations in the United States and Russia. We
then present detailed case studies of negotiations in our chosen cases. We close this
section, and the paper, with an examination of how our findings may influence
policy-making in both the United States and in the Russian Federation as both move
toward the new, Arctic arena.
4.1. Legal background on industry-indigenous relations in the US and Russia
Today, indigenous peoples of the world and their ancestral land are in danger of
alienation and cultural extinction because of the triple-threat of climate change,
assimilation, and destructive extraction industries. Some pieces of international
legislation attempt to shield indigenous communities and lands from these threats,
such as the momentous United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) of September 2007, which seeks to protect individual and
collective indigenous rights. The UNDRIP, an international agreement that took
nearly twenty-five years to design, has garnered different reactions from global powers.
Indeed, neither Russia nor the United States initially supported the declaration,
allegedly on the grounds that support for the declaration could undermine their own
sovereignty during land and natural resource disputes.25
Three years after the introduction of UNDRIP, in December 2010 and in response
to pressure by domestic indigenous groups, President Barack Obama announced
America’s endorsement of the legislation.26 And yet, indigenous peoples were not
reassured by the lukewarm nature of the following caveat: ‘‘The United States
understands [the importance of a] call for a process of meaningful consultation with
tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders, before the actions
addressed in those consultations are taken.’’27 In short, the Obama administration
made it clear that endorsement of the UNDRIP was not legally binding for
negotiations that started prior to December 2010.28
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The Russian Federation continues to abstain from the UNDRIP. The official
position of the Kremlin regarding the UNDRIP is that some of its provisions do not
satisfy Russian interests.29 In the oil-and-gas-rich Russian Federation, a domestic
legal framework regulates the relationship between the indigenous peoples and
extractive companies. It stipulates that negotiations must occur in concordance with
the Russian Constitution, which ‘‘guarantees the rights of indigenous peoples in
accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law
and international treaties ratified by the Russian Federation.’’30 Furthermore, Russia
has regional legislation that governs industry-indigenous relations on a local level.
It should be noted that the definition of indigenous is different in the United States
and the Russian Federation. Native Americans, Indians, or the category of
Indigenous Peoples in the United States refers to nations or tribes that pre-dated
the European colonization of the Americas. In Russia, identity politics are somewhat
more complicated. National minorities that are formally recognized, such as Tatars,
gained their minority status during Soviet rule. Titular minorities such as these
benefit from substantial rights, ranging from autonomous regional control to the right
to teach indigenous languages in regional primary schools. It is unfortunate that for
many indigenous minorities in Russia, federal legislation has a 50,000 person cut-off.
In practice, this means a group may be recognized as a small-in-number minority, but
it does not have access to collective or land rights in the way that a titular group might.
There have been numerous attempts since 1999 to design a comprehensive policy to
better-define indigenous peoples in Russia (Federal Law 82-FZ, Article 3, for
example). Due to this legal gap, non-governmental organizations like the Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) serve a critical role in
assisting the indigenous community against industrial exploitation.31
4.2. Socio-political background on industry-indigenous relations in the US and
Russia
Domestically, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON)
is particularly active in mediating conflicts between oil and gas companies and the
indigenous community. Founded in 1990 at the First Congress of Indigenous People
of the North USSR, RAIPON is a non-governmental organization (NGO) that
organizes rights-based legal and legislature advocacy for approximately 270,000
individuals from 41 indigenous groups across Russia.32 In particular, RAIPON aids in
domestic and international mediation, publishes various newsletters on indigenous
issues, operates a youth empowerment wing, and trains members of the indigenous
community in legal literacy (for example, how to survey indigenous land to determine
damage costs after extractive projects while complying with federal and regional
guidelines).33 In 2008, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERN) requested that the Russian state make efforts to draw its
domestic treatment of its indigenous population in line with UNDRIP, particularly
regarding land rights, access to hunting and fishing resources, compensation, and
political representation.34
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While Russia originally agreed to CERN’s suggestions, the state did not
follow through. Thus, in the early summer of 2012, RAIPON, together with the
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and the Institute for
Ecology and Action Anthropology (INFOE) submitted a review proposal to the
Human Rights Council, requesting that they pressure the Russian state to follow
through on their agreement with CERN and implement the promises of Federal
Law 82-FZ (1999), entitling indigenous communities to compensation for land
damage.35 Subsequently, when the Russian Ministry of Justice ordered the forced
closure of the NGO with Resolution 2332-r in 2012, RAIPON’s Vice President,
Dmitry Berezhkov, publicly suggested that the state attacked the organization for the
latter’s criticisms regarding natural resource exploitation.36 As an organization that
prioritizes land rights for indigenous peoples in the oil-rich state, Berezhkov’s
argument is not necessarily new: indigenous people are legally permitted to hunt
and fish on their ancestral land, even if this land is federally owned. However, because
of RAIPON’s trans-national partners and their membership in various international
organizationsfrom the Arctic Council to the United Nations Economic and Social
Councilit is possible that the Russian state perceived them as a strong, vocal, and
even foreign-backed threat. Indeed, in February 2013, while RAIPON remained
under forced closure, the Russian state signed an extractive agreement with Exxon
Mobil Corp and Rosneft that would give the two oil and gas monoliths access to the
country’s Arctic region.37
In March 2013, a restructured RAIPON emerged with new leadership at its helm,
along with public acknowledgement of the merits of a self-sufficient policy regarding
energy security.38 Current RAIPON President, Grigoriy Ledkov, also serves the
State Duma of the Federal Assembly as a bureaucrat on indigenous rights. In
particular, Mr. Ledkov acts as both the Chair of the Duma Working Group for
Nationality Issues and the Head of the Permanent Delegation of the State Duma to
the Nordic Council.39 However, it appears that RAIPON, its leadership, and the
indigenous advocacy community in Russia remained on the Ministry of Justice’s
radar. A year later, in September 2014, a group of indigenous-rights activists,
including former-RAIPON Vice President Pavel Sulyandziga, had their passports
seized en route to the United Nations World Conference on Indigenous Peoples.40
In an interview, Sulyandziga accused state security of holding the team over their
loud opinions regarding resource exploitation and land rights in Siberia and the
Arctic.41 State restrictions on indigenous-rights advocacy have since expanded.
In early 2016, the Ministry of Justice declared the International Development
Fund for Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East ‘Batani’ to be
a foreign agent under the November 2012 Foreign Agent Law, 121-FZ. The law
prohibits organizations from using foreign aid to pressure Russia domestically.
Weeks later, the Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North, an
organization run by Pavel Sulyandziga’s brother, Rodion, also ran into legal troubles
per 121-FZ.42
Geopolitics also play a role in a state’s decision to adopt the UNDRIP.
For example, in 2012, the international community used its networks and influence
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to overrule the shutdown of RAIPON, a clear affront to national sovereignty.
Perhaps in response, in December 2015, the Russian Federation decreed that
domestic law would trump an international law or ruling.43 However, legal scholars
like Ruslan Garipov suggest that this passed in response to the European Court
of Human Rights as opposed to international declarations such as the UNDRIP,
and that Russia will continue to adhere to international institutions like the latter.44
Despite potential threats to state sovereignty, a commitment to multilateral
legislation demonstrates to the international community that a state is willing
to make a credible commitment to upholding a particular law or norm. This
credible commitment is valuable not only to the domestic population that it
concerns, but also to the maintenance of stability in a sometimes-chaotic
international community.
In the United States, alternatively, indigenous communities are permitted to
organize politically for both domestic and international purposes. Indeed, indigenous
communities hold pseudo-sovereignty, operating as domestic dependent nations
with independent representation at the federal level. However, the US is still
criticized for its treatment of its native minority. In 2012, an independent body from
the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) declared that indigenous communities in
America:
‘‘Face significant challenges that are related to widespread historical wrongs,
including broken treaties and acts of oppression, and misguided government
policies, that . . . manifest themselves . . . [as] impediments to the exercise of their
individual and collective rights.’’45
And while present-day America cannot erase the nation’s violent past, current
leadership does attempt to right historical wrongs. In 2013, President Barak Obama
increased the federal budget for indigenous affairs by three percent and members of
the indigenous community continue to benefit from affirmative action programs at
publicly funded state universities and in the public sector.46 Furthermore, the
passing of the Affordable Healthcare Act and its proposed reconstruction in 2017
under President Donald Trump may offer new opportunities in healthcare coverage
to members of the indigenous community. Even so, US Census statistics note that ‘‘a
quarter of all Native Americans live in poverty’’ with ‘‘rates of alcoholism . . . five
times that of the rest of the US population.’’47 Combine these statistics with major
political battles like the Keystone XL pipeline that runs through indigenous territory,
oil spills in the Mississippi River or the Gulf of Mexico, and calls to return national
sites to indigenous populationslike Mount Rushmore or a growing number of
college campusesand it becomes clear that the United States has a long way to go in
meeting equitable standards for its indigenous peoples.
4.1.1. Region one: Russian inland
The Tyumen Region (including the Autonomous Regions of Khanty-Mansi
and Yamalo-Nenets) is located largely in the southwestern part of Russia’s
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West Siberian plain. The topography of western Siberia is unique, and traditional
forms of farming in northern Tyumen remain of great cultural and economic
importance. In fact, the world’s largest herd of reindeerover 700,000can be found
in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District. Likewise, the heavily regulated Ob
Basin in Yugra is home to over fifty species of rare fish.
In 1964, oil and gas were discovered in the area, which, in turn, has shaped the
region’s way of life and economic activity. Despite industrialization, many indigenous
peoples of the northNenets, Khanty, Mansi, Selkups, and other groupscontinue to
live in Tyumen Region. The majority continue to practice the traditional, indigenous
ways of life: herding and nomadism. Today, Tyumen Region is Russia’s main source
of oil and gas.
Nomadic peoples and the oil and gas industry each have their own, often
contradictory, interests regarding this shared land. As a result, the state has actively
intervened between these two actors through the establishment of various institu-
tions that seek to protect both the heritage of indigenous groups and valuable state
resources. For example, the Tyumen Industrial Institute (now the University of Oil
and Gas) and the Institute for the Development of the North both work to find
collaborative solutions regarding pollution, cultural infringement, and ecological
preservation.
The state also works to integrate its indigenous population politically: for example,
the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District has its own parliament, in which three seats
are allocated to indigenous representatives. In the Nenets Autonomous District, Yuri
Hantazeysky, a representative of the Nenets People, holds the position of Deputy
Governor and oversees issues relating to indigenous peoples. Furthermore, in 2011,
a number of legislative provisions were adopted in Tyumen Region to protect the
rights of its indigenous peoples, thereby protecting them from spatial reduction,
granting them environmental sanctuaries, and giving them the opportunity to
maintain control over sacred spaces.48
Most importantly, perhaps, companies involved in oil production in Western Siberia
are legally required to cooperate with communities living near the oil fields.49 The
effects of this obligation are largely positive. For example, Rosneft frequently hires
indigenous hunters to protect extraction sites from wild animals, allots compensation
for displaced people, and develops programs to facilitate cooperation between the
company and local residents.50 In 2015, for example, Rosneft gave 39 million rubles to
‘‘support the traditional way of life and improve the living conditions of small
indigenous peoples of the North.’’51 From our interviews with company executives
and indigenous leaders from the oil-rich, northern Tyumen Region, we understand
this support to be not only in the form of resource-benefits (unlimited gasoline for
personal use, extractive rents provided to residents in exchange for their compliance,
and paid labor opportunities designed for native workers on extractive projects), but
also indirect benefits such as funded schooling for area children and paid vacations for
affected families.52 Indigenous interests appear to be relatively and largely protected
by federal, regional, and local legislation in the oil-rich Tyumen Region. However,
despite measures taken by the government and various organizations, the peaceful
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coexistence of indigenous peoples and oil companies is frequently violatedcompanies
do not always effectively incorporate indigenous interests and actors into their
extractive projects and, as we saw in the case of Sergey Kechimov, sometimes local
actors fight back in violent ways.
4.1.2. Region two: Remote Russia
Sakhalin Region is one of the most remote regions of Russia. It is situated just
off the east coast of Russia’s mainland, to the north of Japan. Oil drilling on the
island of Sakhalin began in the early 1990s. Extractive projects, called Sakhalin-1
and Sakhalin-2, were launched in 1994 and 1996, respectively, on the basis of a
production-sharing agreement between the Sakhalin consortium of energy companies
(including Shell, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi), the Sakhalin regional government, and the
federal government. By the time both projects began to draw revenue in 1998,
environmental advocacy began to gain popularity, attracting national and interna-
tional organizations alike to Sakhalin Region.
In 2001, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin Region
(RAIPOSR) began to mobilize in order to promote indigenous rights on extractive
projects. RAIPOSR’s goal was to establish a partnership with the project operators
ExxonLTD and the Sakhalin Energy Consortium. A cooperative agreement resulted
between RAIPOSR and ExxonLTD. Indeed, since 2003, the president of the Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin Region and the district representatives
of indigenous peoples have sat on the Coordination Council of ExxonLTD. Unlike
Exxon, the Sakhalin Consortium refused to sign a similar agreement with RAIPOSR,
alleging that RAIPOSR was not an authorized representative of the interests of all the
indigenous peoples of Sakhalin region.
Tensions between the oil industry and the indigenous communities of Russia
worsened, resulting in the ‘Green Wave’ movement of January 2005, in which Nogliki
residents blocked access roads to extraction sites, demanding a teˆte-a`-teˆte with energy
companies. By March, the indigenous community organized the new Regional
Council of Authorized Representatives of Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin Region.
This council would lead the new round of trilateral dialogue between the indigenous
people, the state administration, and energy companies. These talks resulted in the
creation of the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan (SIMDP), a de
facto peace treaty between Sakhalin Energy and Council representatives. The
plan focused on funding educational, cultural, economic, and health-related
initiatives in the indigenous community.53 In November 2010, the SIMDP was
extended for the second phase of the plan (SIMDP-2), which included a budget of
1.56 million dollars for the five years from 2011-2015. Through SIMDP-2, the
procedure for dealing with complaints about inflicted ecological or social harm
became more transparent and systematic. Overall, SIMDP and SIMDP-2 demon-
strate that it is, in fact, possible to create institutional mechanisms to allow a private
company to engage constructively with communities and local authorities on an
extractive process.
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4.1.3. Region three: Continental US
The continental United States is no stranger to negotiations regarding land and
natural resources. This geographic region falls within the contiguous United States
and generally implies a higher population density of both native and non-native
peoples, as well as a strong institutional framework that provides physical access to
markets and bureaucratic channels for negotiations. Tribal areas in the lower United
States are unique, per their proximity to metropolitan centers and subsequent air,
noise, and water pollutants. Continental native communities have a varied history
with collective action; while there are innumerable cases of industry-indigenous
relations to examine in the continental United States, the effective organization and
negotiation tactics demonstrated by the Northern Ute Tribe of present-day Utah
stand out.
A member of the Great Basin classification of Indigenous People, the Ute tribe was
historically divided into many small nomadic bands that resided in the land around
the Colorado Rockies and the high plateaus of southwestern United States.54 While
eleven tribes are distinguishedsix eastern and five westernonly three of these tribes
have settled on reservations: the 1500 members of the Southern Ute Tribe reside in
present-day Colorado; the 2000 members of the Ute Mountain Tribe live in present-
day Utah, New Mexico, and Colorado; and the 1970 members of the Northern Ute
Tribe live in Utah, the tribe’s namesake.55 Today, the Northern Ute Tribe is formally
organized and federally recognized, with its headquarters located in Fort Duchesne,
Utah on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Their reservation is the second-largest
Indian Reservation in the United States, covering approximately 4.5 million acres of
trust land. Included in these four million acres are 40,000 acres of oil, gas, tar sands,
and oil shale.56
In the early 19th century, the Ute controlled about 23.5 million acres of land, which
calculates as approximately 45 per cent of present-day Utah.57 After the Dawes
Severalty Act of 1887intended to more efficiently assimilate indigenous families into
American culturethat landmass was reduced to four million acres.58 By 1930, that
number had dwindled to about 350,000 acres.59 Under the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 (also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act or the Indian New Deal), the
United States government sought to dis-assimilate indigenous peoples throughout the
continental United States by establishing Indian reservations, permitting tribal self-
rule, and returning land and mineral rights to Native Americans. While many tribes
successfully attained federal recognition in the years immediately following the Indian
Reorganization Act, some tribes continue to struggle to gain the privileges associated
with recognition. Perhaps thanks to its strong organizational structurethe Ute are
recognized historically for their attention to communal living and political systems,
the Northern Ute Tribe began to repurchase its territory from the United States
government in 1934.60
Between 1947 and 1955, the Northern Ute Tribe agreed upon large leases for the
vast supply of oil and gas reserves on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. By 1982, the
Indian Mineral Development Act and the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management
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Act permitted tribes to enter into the ‘‘development and sale of mineral resources.’’61
While this meant that the tribe was susceptible to global fluctuations in oil prices and
the American economy, they remained largely in control of the oil on their territory.
By 1990, oil and gas generated approximately seven million dollars in annual revenue
for the tribe. In 2000, the Department of Energy returned the Naval Oil Shale
Reserve to the Northern Ute Tribe.62 By 2001, the tribe’s annual revenue had jumped
to 500 million dollars.63 In 1987, the Department of Energy ‘‘transferred the
[undeveloped] Naval Oil Shale Reserves to the Northern Ute Tribe.’’64
Driven by the successful extractions and energy leases of the late 19th century, in
conjunction with the awareness that oil and gas are nonrenewable and therefore
unsustainable resources and sources of revenue, the Northern Ute Tribe joined the
Council of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT). CERT is a consortium of Native
American tribes that helps reservations to consolidate their control and protest against
unfair extractive projects. Through CERT, the Northern Ute Tribe was able to aggre-
gate its interests with other tribes in negotiations with multinational corporations.65
However, CERT was not able to help the Northern Ute Tribe diversify its holdings
and keep track of its expenses. In 2002, without a tax base or a business plan, the
Northern Ute nearly went bankrupt. The tribe bounced back by selling off its oil and
gas resources, collecting water settlement funds, investing in education, and
bundling sales revenue into the creation of the high-tech, fully-integrated Ute
Energy oil and gas company in 2005. By 2006, the tribe developed and leased nearly
300,000 acres of resource-rich land to oil and gas corporations.66 The Ute Energy oil
company conducts all of its own exploratory projects and produced 60 wells between
2002 and 2006. The tribe’s complete takeover of its right to negotiate over its own
resources is historic. Today, the Northern Ute Tribe is the fourth-largest producer of
oil in the region with two billion in annual revenue and a AAA bond rating.67
Learning from its mistakes, the Northern Ute Tribe invested 80 million USD in
extractive exploration in 2007. While oil companies initially disliked the ‘‘new,
assertive Ute tribe’’ of post 2002, they continue to engage the Ute Energy oil
company as a valuable business partner.68
In conclusion: while indigenous herders and hunters struggle to find employment
and durability in traditional indigenous areas like the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous
Region, the Northern Ute have effectively learned to monetize the natural resources
on their land in a way that supports its large reservation while respecting its sacred
sites. From this case, scholars have concluded that a well-organized indigenous actor
is capable of negotiating on its own behalf. However, it is important to recognize that
much of the Northern Ute Tribe’s bargaining capacity comes from the institutional
framework designed by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Indian Mineral
Development Act and the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982,
and the decision of the US Department of Energy to sell the Naval Oil Shale Reserve
to the Northern Ute Tribe in 2000. Therefore, the takeaway seems to be that the
responsibility for creating supportive frameworks in which actors can effectively
bargain must lie with an empowered, neutral, and objective third-party actor, such as
the state or the international community.
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4.1.4. Region four: Remote US
Conflict between indigenous and industrial actors is often rooted in different
understandings of land rights. In the United States, treaties made by Western
colonists with local tribes were often based on linguistic and cultural misunderstand-
ings of property. As settlers moved across the country to fulfill the nation’s ‘manifest
destiny’ and to reach the Pacific Coast, treaties increasingly became tools for
displacement backed by military pressure, and lost any meaningful resemblance to
an agreement made between equal parties.69 Early heritage laws in the United States
continued to reflect Western notions of private property, which made it difficult to
protect sites of value to indigenous peoples, like natural landscapes, or sites that mixed
natural and cultural significance. These laws were also designed to protect private
property owners from federal action, and could not legally accommodate many
industry-indigenous scenarios in which an entire group of people seeks to protect
property (whether private or public) from private action. With such a well-established
history of injustice, Native Alaskans have come to expect little from the US
government, particularly where the protection of culture is concerned.
Cases of indigenous-industry heritage protection conflict in Alaska highlight the
shortcomings of historic preservation regulations that still struggle to accommodate
indigenous cultural properties. Section 106 is a landmark piece of legislation passed
as part of the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). It requires federal
agencies to ‘‘take into account the effects of their undertakings’’ on historic resources
in a transparent and accountable manner, although the regulations do not ultimately
require preservation. The review process involves identifying and researching historic
resources potentially affected, determining effects on these identified resources
(whether sites are on the National Register of Historic Places or may be eligible in
the future), exploring measures to avoid or reduce negative effects, and reaching an
agreement with the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) or, in the case of
indigenous groups, the Tribal Historic Preservation Office.70
Several problems inherent to the current regulations hinder review processes
intended to protect cultural heritage, particularly for indigenous groups. The federal
and state agencies (including the State and Tribal Historic Preservation Offices)
responsible for overseeing the studies and keeping them honest may also see
themselves as being in the business of making projects go smoothly, and view
compliance as merely a paperwork exercise. Systems of compliance are so esoteric
and laden with jargon that they are almost totally inaccessible to the public, resulting
in few real opportunities for tribal advocates to negotiate with project proponents
before serious problems arise. Pro forma public comment and public hearings are
substituted for meaningful conversation with concerned parties. Perhaps this kind of
‘black box’ negotiation made sense when the review process was developed half a
century ago, when agencies and project proponents did not have access to as much
expertise and there were fewer groups equipped to contribute to heritage manage-
ment decisions.71 However, the state of heritage law in the United States today leaves
indigenous groups ill equipped to address private industry actions.
Mitigating the Risks of Resource Extraction
39
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline controversy, which dragged on for years after the 1968
discovery of oil fields in Prudhoe Bay,72 is a prime example of the challenges facing
indigenous land claims in the face of extractive industries. With more untapped oil
than reserves in Texas, engineers from top energy companies rushed to plan a
pipeline that would make Alaska’s oil wealth accessible to the mainland United
States. By early 1969, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) announced an 800-
mile pipeline from Prudhoe Bay above the Arctic Circle to Valdez on Alaska’s
southern coast, cutting across federal, state, and private properties. Due to federal
support, the project was obligated to undergo review under Section 106 and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Natives and environmental activists
stridently opposed the pipeline, which cut across native hunting and fishing grounds
and national forests (ostensibly created to protect nature from industrial incursion).
In 1970, five native villages in Alaska brought a lawsuit against both the private oil
companies and the federal Department of the Interior. They demanded that
construction be delayed until tribes could consult and provide their consent (a
month later, environmental groups also sued the oil companies and Department of
the interior on the grounds that the pipeline violated the National Environmental
Protection Act). Both NEPA and Section 106 required an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed pipeline, which would also consider alternatives to
reduce negative impacts. Native groups and environmentalists argued that the limited
EIS was inadequate.73 Using NEPA, environmental groups won an injunction and
work on the pipeline was stalled in order to complete more thorough assessments and
negotiations with tribal groups. To hasten the process, in 1971 Nixon created the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (NASCA), which (arguably) addressed native
claims to 44 million acres of land, which had gone unresolved for over a hundred years
after American acquisition of the Alaska territory in 1867. NASCA also provided a
cash settlement of nearly $1 billion to tribal members.74
The next year, in 1972, the Department of the Interior released the final
Environmental Impact Studywhich had expanded dramatically from the original
256 pages to a nine-volume comprehensive assessment of the environmental and
economic impact of the pipeline.75 After a 45-day review period, the pipeline was
approved. Environmental and indigenous groups (some of which were dissatisfied
with NASCA) attempted to appeal. In 1973, the appeals court overturned approval
for the pipeline, only to have Congress step in. In a close vote of 50 to 49, the Senate
narrowly passed an amendment to national environmental law, effectively creating an
exception for the pipeline and declaring that the Department of Interior had fulfilled
the requirements of NEPA. Momentum for further opposition dwindled with the
Arab oil embargo, which led to a spike in oil prices. Nixon signed the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act, setting a precedent to table indigenous land rights and
environmental debate in the interest of energy independence.
While Alaska Natives were ultimately unable to stop the pipeline, they did
influence the way that Environmental Impact Assessments are conducted, and along
the way, created a blueprint for how indigenous communities can fight against other
extractive projects, including the recent Keystone XL pipeline.
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5. Case analysis and policy implications
In this paper, we identify four very different cases of indigenous-industry relations. In
Tyumen Region, one of Russia’s largest oil-producing territories, indigenous interests
are largely protected by federal, regional, and local legislation. Although occasional
legal and even violent rifts occur, the region seems to make efforts to integrate
indigenous communities into preliminary negotiations, but alsomore broadlyinto
other sectors like the educational system. Likewise, in Sakhalin, indigenous minorities
are able to successfully negotiate with industrial actors because of institutional
mechanisms, such as SIMDP and SIMDP-2. This process could be further improved
with an expansion of institutional capacity, which requires the compliance of the
regional government. By ensuring that governing actors adequately monitor industry-
indigenous relations in their jurisdiction, third-party bodies like the state or the
international community could create better conditions regarding extractive projects.
Meanwhile, in the United States, a fair amount of variation remains in industry-
indigenous relations. While some indigenous communitiessuch as the sovereign and
resource-rich Northern Ute Tribe, for exampleare able to successfully bargain with
industrial actors, other tribeslike those living on the extremely impoverished South
Dakota Pine Ridge and Rose Bud Reservationslack the resources and the
organization to effectively negotiate for their collective interests. To the north, Alaska
Natives may have been unsuccessful in their attempts to stop the pipeline, but they
were able to influence institutional and policy-related changes that have impacted
future negotiations. Surely, historical institutionalism is at play here; past successes
(and failures) accrue and determine current actions, which, in turn, influence future
behaviors and capabilities. Ultimately, it is this institutional growth over time that
puts indigenous communities of the United States in a position to monetize their
natural resources and bargain collectively. Supportive frameworks do not appear
overnight, they instead take decades and even centuries to build and refine.
The United States and the Russian Federation, despite their numerous differences
and geopolitical tensions, have much in common. In particular, both have numerous
and sizable indigenous communitiessome reports even claim that Native Americans
share genetic material with indigenous Eurasians.76 Second, both nations possess
ample natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas. Third, both nations
currently regard the Arctic as the next frontier of resource extraction. In an age of
conflict throughout the Middle East, these domestic resources can aid both nations
in becoming self-sustaining with regard to energy use and production, thereby
potentially leading to stronger national currencies, lower costs of living, and even
higher domestic approval ratings. Considering these similarities, we understand that
the barriers to successful industry-indigenous relationsincluding potential spills,
violent protests, and failed negotiationsoperate similarly in both Russia and the
United States. In order to ensure strong negotiations on extraction projects and, in
turn, to strengthen the economic and political nature of each state, federal
authorities in both countries must become inextricably involved in ensuring that
these negotiations are conducted in a fair and just manner. This also means that each
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state must commit to certain, shared international legislationsuch as the UNDRIP
that protects indigenous communities and native lands from imperfect, dangerous,
or depleting extractions.
This ability to work together, or at least in tandem, is important for a number of
reasons. First, by collaborating on solutions, sharing best practices, orat the least
holding domestic actors accountable to international law and norms, the United
States and Russia can help set global standards for the treatment of native peoples
with regard to extractive procedures. Second, these two countries can contribute their
own lessons learned to nations throughout the developing world. By serving as leaders
and mentors on resource extraction and indigenous rights for developing nations,
Russia and the United States can contribute to the preservation of minority cultures,
sacred lands, and indigenous traditions. Third, by sharing best practices or holding
similar laws as just, the United States and Russia can demonstrate their commitment
to international peace. Just as strong economic linkages across states can serve as a
deterrent to conflict,77 shared or parallel practices regarding industry-indigenous
relationsespecially in their common Arctic regioncan further bind together these
two potentially conflictual states through their pursuit of shared objectives. Indeed, by
promoting preliminary negotiations that comply with international law on extractive
projects, the United States and Russia can demonstrate shared interests to the
industry-indigenous actors, to their domestic populations, and to the international
community. While shared interests and institutions might not completely quell the
threat of international conflict, they can repair economic and legal relations between
the two states and help boost public support for diplomatic engagement. We attest
that these transnational efforts bode wellpeacefully, evenfor all of the actors
involved.
The takeaways across these cases are as follows: first, negotiations are improved
through collaboration and collapse when one actor diverges. Second, preliminary
negotiations definitely lead to more successful operations, and this is increased when
protective provisions are both institutionalized and monitored, usually by a third-
party, identified as the state or the international community. We, therefore, suggest
that the institutionalization of protections and the monitoring of participation will
lead to more successful negotiations on extractive projects. In some cases, when a
company provides financial benefits, the indigenous community may become
benefits-addicted and therefore may no longer be interested in negotiating for
autonomous authority and resource control. Neutral and objective third-party actors
can mitigate this resource dependence by creating required extractive consultant
positions held by indigenous representatives on all resource-based projects. In
general, this will result in a shared burden, which may lead to more carefully
negotiated contracts and extraction plans.
An indigenous actor is thought to benefit most from this kind of monitoring, as
institutional frameworks such as the one proposed in this paper are understood to
mitigate commitment problems in otherwise unequal negotiations.78 However, we
argue that industrial actors can also reduce their long-term costs by engaging in
short-term negotiations. It is possible that these two types of actors could engage in
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successful self-mediation without the assistance or monitoring of a third-party actor.
However, the ideal negotiation process would be restrained by a system of checks and
balances. And, considering that institutional bodies responsible for overseeing
indigenous or energy-related issues already exist in both the US and Russian
governmentsindeed Article 3 of the aforementioned Federal Law 82-FZ specifically
outlines the state’s responsibility to ensure that extractive projects do not negatively
affect indigenous peoples, their land, and their livelihood without good faith
consultations, prior informed consent, and, if necessary, compensation79, it seems
plausible that the monitoring of resource extractive conflicts could fall within their
mandates. This includes not only equal industry and indigenous partners, but also an
active state that can oversee negotiations from a neutral and just position. The state,
in this case, would also be constrained by the system of international norms and rules
that, theoretically, govern domestic behavior. Therefore, a clear chain of command
would be in place to apply global legal regulations to non-state actors in domestic
conflicts over resource extraction.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the puzzle of why rational actorsindigenous commu-
nities or oil and gas corporationsfail to cooperate on extractive projects, even
though strong collaborative agreements appear to favor both sides. By investigating a
number of comparative cases of industry-indigenous conflict in both the United
States and the Russian Federation, we demonstrate the positive benefits for both
indigenous and industrial actorsthough especially the formerin engaging in
preliminary negotiations on extractive projects. However, these projects must be
monitored by a neutral and objective third party*either in the form of a state or an
international institutionin order to ensure that negotiations are reasonable and
binding. By presenting this comprehensive analysis of both international law and
domestic precedent in these two major northern states, we hope that our paper may
serve as a guide for future collaborative efforts on extractive projects, especially as
Russia and the United States begin to look toward the Arctic. Home to dozens of
indigenous groups and untapped reserves of oil and gas, these states could mitigate
potential conflicts in the Arctic by considering successful and unsuccessful historical
models, as we have done in this paper. A strong partnership between industrial and
indigenous actors could help to ensure not only the stability of extractive projects,
but also the protection of indigenous groups from existential threats associated with
territorial loss.
More broadly, our findings could easily translate beyond the resource extraction
site to other scenarios of unbalanced actors. If heritage professionals wish to have a
stake in preventing cultural injustices, a review process must be developed that values
transparency and inclusivity as much as it does efficient complianceotherwise,
preservation has become a vain component of a bureaucratic exercise. Part of the
solution is political: the status of indigenous communities in relation to their
governmentsand in their ability to conduct negotiations with private actorsmust be
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more clearly and consistently defined. For indigenous groups that do not have
collective legal title to their territory (as under the US reservation system), what
special rights do those groups have to the land and to the cultural resources therein?
Other helpful steps are largely procedural, and will hinge on efficient communication
and coordination between stakeholders, agencies, and project proponents. Indigen-
ous individualswho may hold differing or even conflicting ideas about what
constitutes a fair deal with state or industrial actorsand industrial actors must
have the opportunity to provide meaningful input early on in the review process, and
long before a project is implemented on the ground. Furthermore, a neutral and
objective third-party supervisorwhether in the form of a state or an international
bodyis necessary in ensuring that both indigenous communities and industrial
actors engage in fair and reasonable negotiations. These findingshighlighting both
the importance of autonomous negotiating positions and third-party monitoring
offer important insights for community-corporate relations, not only in the Arctic,
but worldwide. Continuing to negotiate the balance between inclusivity and efficient
decision-making in the shadow of existential threat may be an intimidating proposal,
but it is also arguably a preservationist and a political leader’s most important work
in promoting a just society and diverse heritage for both the present and the future.
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